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Chapter 9
A Tale of Two Cities: Rotterdam,  
Amsterdam and Their Immigrants
Han Entzinger
Rotterdam suffers from a ‘second-city syndrome’. In many countries of the world 
the largest two cities are natural rivals, even though that rivalry is experienced more 
strongly in the second city than in the first one. And indeed, inside the Netherlands 
Rotterdam (population 635,000) tends to look much more often at Amsterdam (pop-
ulation 835,000) than vice versa. At times, the two cities see each other as rivals: 
who will have the National Photo Museum, or host the Olympics (if they will ever 
be granted to the Netherlands)? Rotterdam’s Feyenoord and Amsterdam’s Ajax are 
legendary opponents in the national football league. At other times the relationship 
between the two is more of a joking nature, for example when Rotterdamers do not 
wish to pronounce the name of the Dutch capital city, and call it by its area code 
‘020’ instead.
A major characteristic of both cities is that each of them claims to be very differ-
ent from the other, even though they are only 60 km or a good half-hour train ride 
apart. In this chapter I will explore to what extent they indeed are different, focus-
sing, in line with the theme of this volume, on how immigration has impacted on the 
two. What immigrants have they received, how have these immigrants found their 
way in the fabric of both cities, and how have the cities responded to these influxes? 
As we will see, there are similarities, possibly even more than the rivals may tend to 
believe, but significant differences also exist. These relate to the composition of the 
immigrant flows, including the more recent ones, to the situation of the immigrants, 
but also to either city’s economic, social and political infrastructure. Most data in 
this chapter were collected by the Statistical Offices of both cities for a comparative 
project in which I took part in 2012. It was the first detailed comparative exercise of 
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this type related to immigration and immigrant integration.1 Interestingly, and 
 perhaps also surprisingly, many of the data that were previously available were not 
directly comparable, for example because different categorisations had been used, 
or because survey questions were phrased differently. Unfortunately, there has been 
no follow-up to this project so far, which explains why some of the comparative data 
used in this chapter are not as recent as one might wish.
9.1  A Tale of Two Cities
Amsterdam is a centuries-old trading centre that grew organically, and is now a hub 
for commerce and financial services. It boasts a large, historical city centre with a 
rich cultural life, which serves as a major tourist attraction. Rotterdam is a port and 
industrial city that underwent rapid growth just in the last 150  years. The city’s 
centre was bombed by the Nazis in the Second World War, and then completely 
rebuilt. Since that time Rotterdam has taken on the allure of a modern world city – 
particularly with respect to its architecture. However, this world city has a relatively 
unilateral economic structure that constantly threatens to become obsolete.
Despite these substantial differences, the two cities also have much in common. 
Both have their long tradition of immigration to thank for their growth and prosper-
ity. At the end of the Dutch Golden Age, around 1700, 40% of Amsterdam’s popula-
tion had been born abroad. The seeds of Amsterdam’s wealth were largely laid 
down by Antwerp Protestants, French Huguenots and Portuguese Jews. In later cen-
turies, the percentage of immigrants gradually receded. However, it has been grow-
ing again over the past few decades (Lucassen and Lucassen 2011). At the moment, 
a quarter of Amsterdam’s population is foreign-born. If the children of those 
foreign- born residents are included in the count, it appears that just over half of 
Amsterdam’s population belongs to either a first or second generation of immi-
grants. Unlike in 1700, these immigrants have not only come from neighbouring 
countries, but from all over the world. And no wonder: distance plays a far less 
important role today than it did in the past.
Rotterdam’s immigration tradition is much more recent. It is only since its advent 
as a port and industrial city at the end of the nineteenth century that Rotterdam has 
experienced large-scale immigration. Initially, immigrants mainly came from the 
rural areas of the south of the Netherlands, but in the last 50 years they originated 
from a large number of countries, in particular Suriname, Turkey, Morocco and, 
more recently, Poland. Percentage-wise, as large a share of Rotterdam’s population 
consists of immigrants as is the case in Amsterdam; nevertheless, there are definite 
differences between the immigrant populations of both cities when it comes to 
important aspects like origin and educational level.
1 The full report of this project was published – in Dutch only – as: De staat van integratie (2012). 
It is available on line at: http://www.ois.amsterdam.nl/pdf/2012_destaatvanintegratie.pdf.
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9.2  Demographic Essentials
To the superficial observer the immigrant situation in Amsterdam appears rather 
similar to that of Rotterdam. The percentage of residents with an immigrant back-
ground is almost the same in both cities. On 1 January 2016, just under half (48.3%) 
of the population of Amsterdam were native Dutch according to the definition set 
out by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), namely that the person in question and both of 
his/her parents were born in the Netherlands.2 This percentage was a fraction higher 
in Rotterdam, at 50.2%. However, since 2000 the portion of native Dutch in 
Rotterdam’s population has been declining faster than that of Amsterdam. In that 
year, 60% of Rotterdam’s population were still native, compared to 54.7% in 
Amsterdam. If the populations of both cities continue to develop in a similar man-
ner, Rotterdam will soon overtake Amsterdam  – and The Hague  – as the Dutch 
municipality with the greatest proportion of immigrants.
Who are the immigrants in both cities? We will focus here on the largest four 
communities of non-Western origin in each of the two cities: Surinamese, Antilleans, 
Turks and Moroccans.3 At first glance the differences between the cities seem to be 
relatively small, but they do exist. For years, Surinamese formed the largest immi-
grant community in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam, until they were surpassed by 
Moroccans in Amsterdam in 2010. Although Amsterdam in particular has an image 
of a city where many Surinamese settled down, the proportion of this immigrant 
population is almost identical in both cities: 9.0% in Amsterdam, 8.9% in Rotterdam.4 
Moreover, the number of Surinamese in Rotterdam has increased while it has 
decreased in Amsterdam. This is most likely due to the fact that the formation of a 
Surinamese middle-class in Amsterdam has further advanced than it has in 
Rotterdam. And it is among the middle-classes in particular that we see a large exo-
dus from the city. In contrast, Rotterdam traditionally has more Antilleans than 
Amsterdam, both in percentage terms of the total urban population (3.6% compared 
2 The terms ‘immigrant’ and ‘native Dutch’ (in Dutch ‘allochtoon’ and ‘autochtoon’) are used in 
this text purely in a descriptive sense, and conform to the definitions used by Statistics Netherlands, 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam. This implies that members of the so-called second generation are also 
counted as immigrants, in spite of the fact that they were born in the Netherlands. Statistics 
Netherlands and the two cities also differentiate between Western and non-Western immigrants. 
Western immigrants originate in Europe (except Turkey), North America, Australia, New Zealand, 
Indonesia or Japan. Non-Western immigrants come from all other countries, including those parts 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that are situated in the Caribbean (including the former 
Netherlands Antilles). The concepts have increasingly become criticised lately for a variety of 
reasons (Ham and Van der Meer 2012). Recently, Statistics Netherlands formally discontinued the 
use of the term ‘allochtoon’, replacing it by ‘persons with a migration background’, an internation-
ally much more common term. The differentiation, however, between Western and non-Western 
migrants is still in use.
3 In addition, among Rotterdam’s non-Western population about 15,000 are of Cape Verdean 
descent, which makes them the fifth largest non-Western group in the city. Amsterdam’s Ghanaian 
community is of a similar size. Both groups, however, do not have a counterpart in the other city 
and, mainly for that reason, are left out of the comparisons made in this chapter.
4 Unless otherwise stated, the data in this chapter relate to the situation in 2010.
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to 1.5%) and in absolute numbers (21,000 compared to 11,500). Evidently, many 
newcomers like to settle in close proximity to the fellow country members preced-
ing them.
The two other large immigrant groups, the Turkish and the Moroccans, are nearly 
equal in terms of size, at least when they are considered together: in 2010, 
Rotterdam’s population was 14.5% Turkish or Moroccan, in Amsterdam it was 
14.3%. But the distribution between the groups differed starkly: More Turkish live 
in Rotterdam than Moroccans (47,000 compared to 39,000) while Amsterdam has 
40,000 Turkish and nearly 70,000 Moroccans. This is most likely attributable to the 
fact that, half a century ago, at the time of the recruitment of migrant workers, 
Amsterdam businesses had a preference for those from Morocco, while Rotterdam 
businesses mainly focused on those from Turkey. No research has ever been done 
into the reasons for this. Unlike the Surinamese, there is not yet a decline in the 
growth of the Turkish and Moroccan populations, let alone in their absolute num-
bers – a sign that the formation of a middle-class and the subsequent move to the 
suburbs is not as advanced amongst these immigrant groups. There is certainly a 
trend of moving house amongst the Turkish and Moroccans, but they tend, as yet, to 
stay within the city limits, moving from the old late nineteenth and early twentieth- 
century neighbourhoods to the neighbourhoods that were built in the decades after 
the Second World War.
9.3  Patterns of Settlement and Segregation
Thus, we see that in Amsterdam, between 2000 and 2010, the strongest growth, in 
percentage terms, of non-Western immigrants occurs in the predominantly post-war 
boroughs of Nieuw-West (from 37% to 49%) and Noord (from 27% to 36%). In 
contrast, the older boroughs of West and Oost in this period show a slight decline in 
their non-Western immigrant population: West from 34% to 33% and Oost from 
36% to 34%. The city as a whole, however, experienced an increase in its non- 
Western population  – from 31% to 35%. A similar development took place in 
Rotterdam, where the boroughs of Charlois (from 33% to 46%), IJsselmonde (from 
20% to 34%) and Prins Alexander (from 12% to 20%), built wholly or partially after 
the Second World War, grew relatively quickly. Boroughs with much older build-
ings and a traditionally large immigrant population grew more slowly: Delfshaven 
from 57% to 60% and Feijenoord from 50% to 57%. During the first decade of this 
century, the number of non-Western immigrants in Rotterdam’s total population 
increased from 30% to 37%. Rotterdam has since passed Amsterdam in this respect.
The migration from the older to the post-war neighbourhoods does not mean that 
there is an automatic decrease in the segregation of immigrants. It is worth noting 
that this is the case in Rotterdam, but not in Amsterdam. For example, the segrega-
tion index for the Turkish in Rotterdam decreased from 48 to 38 between 2000 and 
2010, while it increased from 41 to 45 for the Turkish in Amsterdam. The trends are 
similar for the Moroccans: a decrease from 43 to 35 in Rotterdam and an increase 
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from 39 to 42 in Amsterdam. The segregation index indicates what percentage of a 
specific group of a population would have to move to another neighbourhood in 
order to reach a perfectly proportional distribution of that population throughout the 
entire city. Amongst the native Dutch population in Amsterdam we also see an 
increase in segregation, while in Rotterdam there is a (slight) decrease. However, 
the native Dutch population of Amsterdam is still significantly less segregated than 
that of Rotterdam. In Rotterdam, 45% of the native Dutch population would have to 
move in order to achieve a proportional distribution throughout the city; only 27% 
would need to in Amsterdam.
9.4  Shifting Immigration Flows
The most notable differences between the immigrant populations of Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam are among those who do not belong to one of the largest four groups 
(Turkish, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans). Within this ‘residual category’ a 
distinction is made in the population statistics between the ‘Western’ and ‘other 
non-Western’ immigrants. In 2010, 14.9% of the residents of Amsterdam were 
Western immigrants; in Rotterdam the percentage was 10.8. Strikingly, this popula-
tion category grew much faster in the first decade of this century in Amsterdam than 
in Rotterdam (3 percentage points in Amsterdam compared with 1.3 in Rotterdam). 
In that same period, however, the category ‘other non-Western immigrants’ grew 
much faster in Rotterdam: from 7.5% to 10%, while Amsterdam only showed an 
increase from 9.9% to 10.1%. One may suspect a connection here with differences 
in the demand for labour, and perhaps in the general power of attraction between the 
two cities, but more on that later. One should not, however, assume without question 
that the Western immigrants remain mainly at the top of the labour market and the 
non-Western immigrants largely on the bottom. For example, all EU citizens, 
including the Polish, Romanians and Bulgarians are counted as Western immi-
grants. Many of them perform low-skilled labour. Conversely, the highly skilled 
knowledge migrants that originate from, amongst others, countries like India and 
China belong to the non-Western immigrant group. This provides a first indication 
of the declining usefulness of the classification criteria commonly used in Dutch 
immigration statistics (Ham and Van der Meer 2012).
Furthermore, we see in both cities that the first generation among all groups is 
decreasing in size in relative terms, while the second generation is growing. In fact, 
the growth in the total size of the ‘classic’ immigrant groups is solely the result of 
the increase in the second generation. New immigration  – for instance, family 
migration – has nearly come to a halt in the ‘classic groups’; national figures also 
back up this pattern and the expectation is that it will remain so for these groups 
(Nicolaas et al. 2011).
This increases the average length of time the ‘classic’ immigrant groups have 
been established. The average Moroccan resident in Amsterdam has now been liv-
ing longer in the city than the average native Dutch person. When it comes to the 
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Western immigrants, we see just the opposite: the most recent immigrants include 
more and more people with a Western background. Many of them appear to leave 
again quickly, often also leaving the Netherlands. In general, immigrants from 
Western countries exhibit a higher mobility than those that have come here from 
non-Western countries. Thus, one can assume that slowly changing patterns of 
migration in the long run will lead to fewer immigrants taking up permanent resi-
dence in the Netherlands than was the case in recent decades (Entzinger 2014). 
There is no reason to believe that this is different in the two largest cities from any-
where else in the country. However, one may expect a relatively high proportion of 
the newcomers to the Netherlands to settle down initially in Amsterdam or 
Rotterdam. This has been the case for many years. All over Europe newcomers 
demonstrate a strong preference for settling in a metropolitan environment. Fellow 
countrymen often live there, there is often a package of provisions that matches 
their needs and there are better opportunities to earn an income.
9.5  The Educational and Employment Situation
Rotterdam’s population, on average, has a much lower education than Amsterdam’s. 
This is the case not only for the native Dutch, but also for their immigrant popula-
tions. In 2008, in Rotterdam the ratio between highly educated native Dutch 
(Bachelor’s degree or higher) and native Dutch with a low education (maximum 
lower professional education or vmbo-plus) was 1 to 1 (30% versus 31%). In 
Amsterdam, by contrast, there were almost three highly educated native Dutch for 
every native Dutch with a low education (48% versus 18%). Also in 2008, 56% of 
the non-Western immigrants in Rotterdam had a low education, compared to 41% 
in Amsterdam. Only 11% of Rotterdam’s non-Western immigrant population was 
highly educated, against Amsterdam’s 23%. So, Rotterdam housed five low edu-
cated non-Western immigrants for each non-Western immigrant with a higher edu-
cation, while the ratio in Amsterdam was roughly 2 to 1.
The substantial differences between native Dutch and immigrants in terms of 
education somewhat obscure the fact that, over the past two decades, a remarkable 
increase occurred in the overall educational level. However, this increase has taken 
place in both cities almost equally as fast and – more importantly – the level of 
education of both the native Dutch and the non-Western immigrants also increased 
at about the same speed. Thus, the educational gap between the two cities has not 
really narrowed, nor has the gap between the different groups. Within the major 
non-Western communities, the Turkish and the Moroccans have the lowest average 
level of education, while the Surinamese, Antilleans and other groups occupy an 
intermediate position between them and the native Dutch population.
Notwithstanding the persistence of the educational gap, there has been a signifi-
cant increase in the participation of immigrants in higher education: There is hardly 
any underrepresentation of immigrant students in higher professional education 
(hbo) in both cities to speak of anymore. There is still room for catching up at the 
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university level, particularly for the non-Western immigrant groups. The conclusion 
must be that the share of highly educated immigrants in both cities is certainly 
increasing, but at the same time that the immigrants will remain overrepresented 
amongst the low educated for a long time still. The fact that with new waves of 
immigration, there are also new arrivals of low educated immigrants is also a cause.
A comparison of data in the field of labour for the two cities leads to conclusions 
that are remarkably similar to those for education. In 2010, gross labour force par-
ticipation in Amsterdam (employed plus job seeking) was 5 percentage points 
higher than in Rotterdam (73% versus 68% of all 15–64 year-olds). In both cities 
participation among the native Dutch is roughly 20 percentage points above the 
level of persons of Turkish or Moroccan descent, with the Surinamese once more 
occupying an intermediate position. In the past two decades, labour force participa-
tion of non-native Dutch has increased remarkably – notwithstanding conjunctural 
fluctuations – but the participation level of the native Dutch has increased at almost 
the same speed. Consequently, the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants 
has hardly narrowed, a phenomenon similar to that in education.
The lower employment rate of Turkish and Moroccans appears to be caused in 
both cities largely, though not exclusively, by the low number of women participat-
ing in the labour market. In both cities only about one in ten native Dutch women 
aged 25–34 are not part of the labour force. Of Turkish and Moroccan women in this 
age group, by contrast, one in two do not participate. One can assume that the dif-
ference in the age categories above 35 years is at least as large, if not larger. One 
promising trend, however, is that the non-participation among young Turkish and 
Moroccan women of the second generation is at about half the level of the first gen-
eration, although it is still well above that of the native Dutch women. There may be 
cultural reasons for these differences. However, there is also ample evidence that 
persons with an immigrant background experience more obstacles when entering 
the labour market than their native Dutch counterparts. They do not always have the 
same networking and language skills and they may be victims of (indirect) discrimi-
nation. In addition, low-educated immigrants also face tougher competition than 
those with higher qualifications in a labour market that constantly puts up its 
demands. This is a bigger problem in Rotterdam, where the supply of low-skilled 
labour is substantially larger than in Amsterdam. I will come back to this later.
9.6  The City as a Way Station
As already mentioned, big cities exert an almost universal attraction to immigrants. 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam are no exception. The nineteenth-century immigrants to 
both cities came mainly from the Dutch countryside and from neighbouring 
European countries. In the twentieth century, especially in the second half, we saw 
a surge of migration from more distant regions, even outside of Europe. This devel-
opment seems far from over, despite the increasing call in political circles for a 
stricter immigration policy. The demand for labour, the fact that both cities have 
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significant immigrant communities established and the attraction this has for new 
immigrants, as well as the greatly improved communication and transportation 
facilities will make Amsterdam and Rotterdam attractive locations for newcomers 
in the future as well. The fact that both cities have a large number of relatively cheap 
accommodations for hire will certainly play a role.
However, the two cities are not only destinations of choice for newcomers: they 
are ever more becoming way stations. Gradually, a process of social ascent starts 
taking place in the larger, longer established communities of predominantly lower 
educated immigrants, a process which is often associated with geographic mobility 
in the form of a departure to the suburbs, which offer more space and tranquillity. 
We see here a repetition of the emancipation process that took place in the decades 
after the Second World War among the native Dutch. Thus far, the process is more 
evident among the Surinamese than among the other two major ‘classic’ immigrant 
groups, the Turkish and Moroccans, but eventually, for many of them social and 
geographical mobility will go hand in hand, all attempts at housing differentiation 
within existing neighbourhoods notwithstanding. The gentrification process that 
some older neighbourhoods in both Rotterdam and Amsterdam are undergoing, 
may keep some of the upwardly mobile within the city limits. Given its present 
scale, however, it is not very likely that this will involve large numbers.
It is not expected that all members of the ‘classic’ immigrant groups will undergo 
a process of social and geographical mobility. The data for both cities clearly show 
a growing division, also within the migrant communities. Some of them are pros-
pering (sometimes as entrepreneurs), others remain in a situation of deprivation, 
characterized by low education, poor housing, little prospect of work, poor health 
and crime. This situation can easily continue in the third and even subsequent gen-
erations. The less successful ones will remain in the ‘disadvantaged’ neighbour-
hoods, and the homes left behind by the departure of the more successful ones will 
become free and occupied once more by newcomers. More often than before, these 
will not be (large) families who will permanently settle in the Netherlands, but sin-
gles or small groups living as ‘passers-by’: migrant workers from Poland, the 
Balkans, but also from outside the European Union, among them illegal 
immigrants.
This will cause the least attractive part of the housing stock in the big cities to 
attain even more of a way station character, with all of the attendant risks: neglect 
of houses, lack of social cohesion, deprivation, public health risks and crime. If we 
do not want to leave these areas to their fate, we need to invest heavily in the quality 
of housing and living environment, properly oversee the enforcement of rules, and 
also invest in integration, education and facilities for health, sports and welfare. 
Paradoxically, the residents of these neighbourhoods will probably not always know 
how to value these investments, as their involvement in the neighbourhood and even 
the entire urban society is rather limited. The local government should not expect 
the social involvement to increase dramatically due to a better social climate. The 
romantic notion of the old city neighbourhood with its sense of community is really 
a thing of the past, if it even really existed to the extent that people now sometimes 
assume. Yet this is not an argument against investing, otherwise important parts of 
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both cities could slide into becoming no-go areas for the rest of the urban 
population.
The way station character of both Amsterdam and Rotterdam will not only 
become ever more manifest in the socio-economically lower levels, but also at the 
top. The figures show that more and more highly educated immigrants from both 
Western and non-Western countries are settling in the Netherlands, Amsterdam as 
yet being considerably more popular than Rotterdam. There should also be attrac-
tive housing available for them and their arrival can affect the social fabric of the 
city as well. Although they generally require less public attention than the socio- 
economically disadvantaged, they will also require special educational facilities, 
leave their mark on the local associations and perhaps demonstrate less involve-
ment in their surroundings than the native Dutch population because many of them 
know they will not remain for long and therefore will not always take the trouble to 
learn Dutch.
9.7  The Importance of the Economy
Amsterdam and Rotterdam will each in their own way develop even more into 
‘international’ cities – and become ever more distinct from the rest of the Netherlands 
(with the possible exception of The Hague, the third largest city of the country, 
where a similar development may occur). This internationalization will have an 
effect on all areas: the nature and level of facilities, the social fabric, education, 
health, political participation and so forth. Although both cities experience this 
development, there are significant differences. These have mainly to do with the fact 
that the two urban economies are decidedly different. Amsterdam is envisaged in 
the literature as a typical global city, though obviously not with the character and 
size of a New  York or London, but one of the second or perhaps third echelon 
(Sassen 1991, 2006; Van der Waal and Burgers 2009). Some important features of 
such a global city are that a large proportion of economic activity has a strong inter-
national focus (e.g. in the form of housing the headquarters of multinational enter-
prises), that there is a highly differentiated economic palette and that it contains a 
particularly dominant service sector. The most important branches of economic 
activity in Greater Amsterdam are (in decreasing order): financial institutions, trade 
and commerce, consultancy and research, and information and communication. 
These four taken together account for well over 50% of the gross regional product 
in the Amsterdam area, which amounts to €75,000 per inhabitant. This is almost 
one-and-a-half times higher than anywhere else in the Netherlands, which illus-
trates the great economic importance of the city (Jonkers 2017).
Global cities may also be described as cosmopolitan, having a very diverse popu-
lation and a rich cultural scene. Global cities are certainly not only for the elite, and 
their labour market is best described by using the hourglass model. The relatively 
large, higher educated, high earning share of the population generates a lot of demand 
for domestic and other services, which are provided by the lower educated workers. 
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While global cities generally radiate dynamism, the threat of dichotomization, polar-
ization and segregation always looms above the market. Amsterdam more emphati-
cally satisfies the image of a global city than Rotterdam does (Van der Waal 2010a).
Rotterdam is better typified as a post-industrial city, characterized by one domi-
nant economic activity, its port. And even though employment in the port has 
declined enormously in the past few decades, a large part of the Rotterdam economy 
is still directly or indirectly related to the port, such as the very important transport 
and logistics sector. To illustrate this: in 2014, 444.7 million tonnes of goods passed 
through the port of Rotterdam as against 97.8 million tonnes through Amsterdam. 
This made Rotterdam by far the largest port in Europe (Antwerp is second), and 
Amsterdam the fifth largest. The main branches of economic activity in the greater 
Rotterdam area are (in decreasing order): trade and commerce, transport and stor-
age, industry, and health and welfare. Jointly they contribute to almost half of the 
gross regional product, which stands at €43,000 per inhabitant, less than 60% of its 
Amsterdam equivalent (Jonkers 2017).
The Rotterdam labour market much less takes the shape of the hourglass model 
than that of Amsterdam, but is characterized by employment opportunities at all 
levels, including the intermediate levels. At first glance, Rotterdam would therefore 
offer better possibilities for low-skilled workers than Amsterdam, but there is also a 
downside. Because the low-skilled work opportunities in Rotterdam are related less 
directly to the demand from the highly skilled segment of the labour market than in 
a global city like Amsterdam, the risk is greater that low-level and mid-level func-
tions will relocate elsewhere: why employ Dutch truck drivers when the Polish are 
cheaper? Rotterdam therefore in effect experiences stronger outside competition 
than Amsterdam, which is all the more problematic as the proportion of the lower 
educated in Rotterdam is much larger than in Amsterdam. Rotterdam will have to do 
its utmost to retain employment opportunities for its low-skilled workers. In the past 
decade, it needs be said, the city has been highly successful in retaining those work-
ers. In the 2000s, unemployment among lower educated workers declined even 
more than in Amsterdam, as did the number of benefits claimants. Since the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008, however, this pattern has reversed. In 2016, the overall unem-
ployment level in the Greater Rotterdam area stood at 8%, against 6% for Amsterdam. 
For a long time, the level of reliance on public assistance was very similar in the two 
urban areas, but since 2011 it has slightly increased in Rotterdam, while it has 
remained constant in Amsterdam. In 2016, 37 inhabitants per thousand benefitted 
from public assistance, while the corresponding number in Rotterdam stood at 41 
(Jonkers 2017). One should keep in mind, however, that reliance on public assis-
tance tends to be higher among the low-educated, and Rotterdam has many more of 
them than Amsterdam has. For both cities, but certainly for Rotterdam, it is and 
continues to be of great importance to invest in good job training possibilities, in a 
smooth transition from school to employment, as well as in retraining and perma-
nent education for workers whose knowledge threatens to become obsolete.
As we have seen repeatedly, the proportion of lower educated workers in the 
Rotterdam population is considerably larger than in Amsterdam’s, both among the 
native Dutch and among those with an immigrant background. This fact could 
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account for a number of differences between the two cities, for example the differ-
ences in health, in social and political involvement and in the extent to which the 
population identifies with their neighbourhood, city and country. Overall, the 
Amsterdam scores on these indicators tend to be higher than those in Rotterdam. It 
could also explain why Amsterdam at the borough and neighbourhood level has a 
slightly stronger ethnic segregation than Rotterdam. Ethnic and socio-economic 
lines fall together more decidedly in Amsterdam than in Rotterdam. Perhaps this is 
an explanation of why in Rotterdam the Freedom Party scored more than twice as 
high at the 2017 parliamentary elections as in Amsterdam (15.6% versus 6.8%). 
This populist party is well known to attract mainly native, lower educated voters. 
These voters are more likely than higher educated natives to experience displace-
ment and competition from the immigrant labour supply (Van der Waal et al. 2011). 
It may equally explain why Rotterdam’s largest local political party, Liveable 
Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam), which also has significant populist traits, has no 
equivalent in Amsterdam’s local political scene.
Yet there are contraindications that are more difficult to interpret. Crime statistics 
are traditionally higher among the lower than among the higher educated, yet 
Amsterdam still has significantly more crime than Rotterdam. This may result from 
the fact that Amsterdam, as a major international tourist city, attracts a lot of foreign 
‘scum’. Also, the more repressive security policy that Rotterdam has implemented 
in the last 15 years – encouraged by Liveable Rotterdam – may play a role here: the 
relatively high number of suspects arrested in Rotterdam may have contributed to 
the reduction in the number of crimes. It is also notable that the Amsterdam resi-
dents have many more inter-ethnic contacts in the private sphere than the Rotterdam 
residents. This is all the more surprising since in Amsterdam ethnic and socio- 
economic boundaries seem to coincide stronger than in Rotterdam, while most 
people usually prefer having contacts not only within their own ethnic group, but 
also with people of similar educational and socio-economic levels.
9.8  The Cultural Climate
A possible reason for this last paradox may be found in the research of some of my 
close colleagues at Erasmus University (Van der Waal et  al. 2011). Following 
American researchers, such as Richard Florida (2004), they introduced the concept 
of ‘cultural climate’, which does not so much denote a summary of characteristics 
and attitudes of individual citizens as it does a specific urban environment or climate 
that affects the ideas of the local population. In American studies, this concept has 
been operationalised through the so-called Bohemian Index, derived from Florida 
(2002). The index refers to the number of city residents involved in producing art 
and culture. The larger their number relative to the total urban population, the higher 
the tolerance for diversity among the population, or so comparative research in 
American cities has discovered. This applies to the Netherlands as well. Amsterdam 
in particular scores very high on this index, while the Bohemian Index rate for 
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Rotterdam is just slightly below the average for all Dutch cities (Van der Waal 
2010b: 126; Crul and Heering 2008: 123).
Similarly, it is not surprising that, in the latest (2017) general elections held in the 
Netherlands the two political parties that are the strongest advocates of cultural 
diversity – GreenLeft (GroenLinks) and the left-wing liberals of D66 – ended first 
and second respectively in Amsterdam, with a total share of 38.5% of all votes. In 
Rotterdam these two obtained 24.7% of the votes. By contrast, the two largest par-
ties in Rotterdam were the right wing liberal VVD and the populist Freedom Party. 
They obtained 32.1% of all votes, as against 22.1% in Amsterdam.
Van der Waal et al. show that the cultural climate of a city is more decisive for 
the way ethnic groups interact with each other than the system of economic oppor-
tunities (Van der Waal et al. 2011). This could indeed explain why, despite sharper 
social-economic differences between natives and immigrants in Amsterdam, there 
still seems to be more frequent inter-ethnic contact than in Rotterdam. One should, 
furthermore, not lose sight of the fact that the number of Western immigrants is 
much higher in Amsterdam than in Rotterdam and is also growing strongly. Part of 
these immigrants is made up of highly educated Europeans and Americans. It is 
plausible that a certain share of the inter-ethnic contacts in Amsterdam take place 
between highly educated natives and highly educated (Western) immigrants, and 
not between highly educated natives and people who belong to one of the classic 
‘minority groups’. Nevertheless, the latter two categories will also regularly meet, 
namely in the context of the service economy so typical of a global city like 
Amsterdam (Van der Waal 2010a). Although Amsterdam has more inter-ethnic con-
tacts than Rotterdam, considerably more discrimination appears to occur there as 
well. One might assume that more contacts would also lead to more opportunities 
for discrimination to occur, but classical contact theory suggests rather the opposite: 
the more contact, the more mutual understanding increases. In any event, further 
investigation into how socio-economic and cultural differences affect inter-ethnic 
contacts, ethnic stereotyping and discrimination in both cities is desirable. The 
results would undoubtedly contribute to an effective diversity policy.
9.9  Differing Approaches
This brings us to the government’s role in general terms and, more particularly, to 
its role in promoting social participation and harmonious interethnic relations. 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam both have been pursuing an integration policy for sev-
eral decades, even if not always by that particular name. The main goal of this pol-
icy has always been involving immigrants, both individually and as groups, with 
local society. Several studies comparing the Amsterdam and Rotterdam integration 
policies have reached quite different conclusions as regard their contents and effec-
tiveness. Godfried Engbersen in his book Fatale remedies (‘Fatal Remedies’) finds 
that the ‘rhetorics of integration’ has notably differed between the two cities: 
Rotterdam favours a forceful approach, focusing security and law and order and not 
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shying away from intervening in private affairs.5 Amsterdam, on the other hand, 
tends to use a softer ‘multicultural’ model, characterized by the famous desire of 
ex-mayor Cohen to ‘keep things together’. However, Engbersen says, in implement-
ing these contrasting models the cities are more akin than divergent, a conclusion 
shared by Van Ostaijen and Scholten (2013) in their comparison of policy docu-
ments on integration issued by each of the two cities over the past few decades. 
Though the Rotterdam local government at times may talk about a hard-line 
approach to integration, Engbersen argues, it has for years now involved the larger 
Islamic organizations in the city in its policy-making process. The Amsterdam 
authorities, often described as being more ‘soft’, have certainly acted vigorously 
against criminal youth (Engbersen 2009: 171–191).
In contrast to Engbersen, Justus Uitermark in his thesis Dynamics of Power in 
Dutch Integration Policies emphasises the differences between the integration poli-
cies of the two cities. He notes that the Rotterdam integration policy has been 
remarkably consistent, whatever the political composition of the local government 
at any one time. The desire to prevent strongly concentrated migrant populations in 
some neighbourhoods has been a central theme of the policy for quite a while now. 
Rotterdam has also pursued a vigorous civic integration policy and systematically 
provided professional support to immigrant organizations when shaping its integra-
tion policy. Even when Liveable Rotterdam is part of the Municipal Executive 
(2002–2006 and, once again, 2014–2018) contact with the Islamic organizations has 
been maintained as ever. This consistency, according to Uitermark, has clearly ben-
efited the transparency and effectiveness of the policy. In Amsterdam, Uitermark 
finds, the policy has been less consistent over the years. Policy targets have been 
adjusted often and though the city offered much support to immigrant organizations, 
it often changed the organizations in favour. Furthermore, support was primarily of 
a financial nature, not of a professional one, as in Rotterdam. And this is why, 
Uitermark concludes, ‘minorities in Rotterdam are more socially and politically 
involved, organizations for minorities are more capable of taking action collectively 
and is there less of a presence of (Islamic) extremism’ (Uitermark 2010: 280).
9.10  Future Perspectives
Amsterdam and Rotterdam have a more diverse population than ever before, yet 
they also display substantial differences, which stem from, in part, their distinct 
economic structures and social-cultural climates. In the future, both cities will con-
tinue to be major poles of attraction for international immigrants. An ever- increasing 
share of the population in both cities has an immigrant background, while an 
increasingly smaller share settles in for the long term. As a result, the two largest 
cities in the Netherlands are more and more developing into way stations. Many 
5 The development of Rotterdam’s local integration policy was analysed in greater detail in 
Entzinger and Engbersen (2014).
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foreign immigrants return to their own countries sooner or later, or even choose to 
migrate on to a new country. Though the immigration waves of a few decades ago 
resulted much more frequently in permanent residency than was presumed at the 
time, one cannot assume that newly arriving international immigrants will continue 
to settle in permanently. And among those that do remain selective mobility, both in 
the geographic and social senses, will eventually occur. This pattern is already 
apparent amongst the older immigrant groups. There is a tendency amongst the 
disadvantaged immigrants to remain in the city whilst those that are more successful 
fan out to the suburbs or integrate into Dutch society to such an extent that they are 
no longer viewed as immigrants (or the descendants of immigrants). Thus, the 
issues of immigration and integration will continue to present important challenges 
to both cities far into the future.
For a long time it was assumed that an integration policy oriented specifically at 
newcomers would be sufficient to allow them to become full members of the local 
urban society. That idea increasingly appears to be outmoded. The immigrant issue 
is so encompassing that an integration policy alone is far from adequate to address 
it. Policy areas like the economy, employment, education, housing and safety are in 
many ways far more important because they provide the basis for all of the citizens 
in a city to participate in society regardless of their level of education and whether 
or not they have an immigrant background. Both Amsterdam and Rotterdam appear 
to be increasingly aware of this, although their approaches up to this point have dif-
fered slightly. Amsterdam seems to invest more in fostering a sense of connected-
ness with the neighbourhood, while Rotterdam is seeking to promote participation 
through organizations. Ethnic background is but one factor in an interplay of forces 
featuring a great many other factors, though. As the number of immigrants rises and 
the length of their stay increases, the composition of the population becomes more 
diverse and will consist of minorities only – especially on the level of individual 
neighbourhoods – the ‘ethnic background’ factor starts to lose distinctiveness and, 
thus, relevance (also see Entzinger 2014).
Moreover, the way station nature is becoming ever more prevalent in some 
neighbourhoods of the cities. The number of people who settle in for the short term 
only will continue to grow and this population will generally only feel a limited 
sense of connectedness with urban society. Municipal executives will have to take 
this increasing way station nature of the bigger cities into account. How can cities 
with such a rapidly-changing, heterogeneous population base develop social cohe-
sion? If this is the key question, promoting the integration of a few specific immi-
grant groups cannot remain the main objective of governmental policy – which both 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam have long since realised. It is much more about creating 
the conditions for an urban society in which everyone feels welcome and everyone, 
no matter how short their stay, can contribute as well. In such urban societies the 
distinction between ‘native’ or ‘immigrant’ will no longer occupy such a central 
position as in past decades. The ethnic background of a citizen can be a relevant 
factor, also in issues of policy  – but it is only one amongst many. It is not a 
 dominating factor that appears to subordinate all others, as is so often the case now. 
As time goes by, the boundary between immigrant and native will continue to erode. 
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Having an immigrant background is no longer, by definition, an indication of social 
deprivation. The immigrant population is becoming more heterogeneous and is 
mixing more and more with the native population. That is how things have always 
been in the past in the Netherlands, and that has been the way of things (almost) 
everywhere else.
9.11  Conclusions
The approach advocated here requires a governmental policy with a primary focus 
on the urban society in its totality. The local government must continue to strive for 
a healthy urban economy, a safe living environment, and for high-quality social, 
cultural and educational facilities that are equally accessible to everyone. This does 
not mean that in the nearby or somewhat distant future questions may not arise 
again that pertain specifically to one or several communities. That is logical in an 
urban society that consists purely of minorities. That is, however, something quite 
different from implementing an integration policy geared towards all minority 
groups. Especially now that no actual majority community seems to exist anymore 
for minorities to integrate in, there is no longer a rationale for a group-oriented inte-
gration policy.
Amsterdam and Rotterdam are developing into what Vertovec has labelled 
‘superdiverse cities’ (Vertovec 2007). In the light of this, and despite the differences 
identified between the cities, we should conclude that a ‘classic’ local integration 
policy aimed at individuals and groups would quickly lose its impact. This certainly 
applies to integration policies that are based on ethnic differences. It appears much 
more sensible to implement an integration policy for the most relevant policy areas 
that, as a matter of principle, looks at all citizens as being equal, but that, like any 
good policy, when necessary takes account of the differences between them, even if 
these differences stem from their immigrant background or culture. The objective is 
no longer primarily the integration of (immigrant) citizens into an existing urban 
society, but rather to promote a sufficiently integrated urban society in which as 
many citizens as possible feel welcome and at home, even those whose involvement 
is and will remain limited. The local government cannot accomplish this by itself. 
Businesses, educational institutions and other societal organisations must also help 
in preventing people from living side by side instead of with each other, even in 
those urban societies that increasingly function as way stations.
Thus, the capacity of governmental policy to shape society should not be overes-
timated. Urban societies develop largely autonomously and many actors other than 
the local governments can exert their influence on that development. This relatively 
autonomous progression also applies to the integration of immigrants. The single 
greatest influence public authorities can exert on the integration process concerns 
issues of legal status and law enforcement. In particular, legal status is extremely 
important for many immigrants: having a secure right to stay is a prerequisite for 
successful integration. This is, however, primarily a matter for the national govern-
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ment. Cities have very little to say about the legal status of immigrants, no more 
than they get to specify which newcomers settle into their borders. The scope of 
local governments is somewhat greater in the social-economic arena, but is limited 
here as well. In our economy it is the market that determines what happens; cities 
may steer market processes in the economy, but to a limited extent only. The cities, 
however, do have a specific responsibility, ever increasing due to decentralisation, 
for the social wellbeing of their citizens. Finally, the role of the government in 
liberal- democratic societies such as ours is limited when it comes to the cultural 
arena. Especially in the bigger cities, local governments are being confronted with 
a multitude of cultures and religions. Their duty then appears to be, above all, to 
guarantee the peaceful co-existence of people of all cultures, and to resolve or de- 
escalate any conflicts that arise. In addition, the importance of the local government 
setting an example when it comes to promoting equal opportunities for all its citi-
zens and to actively combating discrimination should not be underestimated (Collett 
and Gidley 2012).
If this comparison of Amsterdam and Rotterdam has accomplished anything, it 
is surely the understanding that it makes little sense to focus exclusively on the 
course and the management, direct or indirect, of integration processes as long as 
one fails to involve the context within which the processes are taking place. The two 
cities certainly differ in the impact that immigration has had on their social, eco-
nomic, cultural and political fabrics. Yet, both cities clearly show that immigration 
and its consequences exert such a powerful influence on urban development in gen-
eral that it becomes impossible to look at them independently from each other. In 
other words: good integration policy is really nothing more and nothing less than 
good urban policy.
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